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Chapter 12
Tourism and Media Studies 3.0
Toby Miller
University of California, Riverside, USA
ABSTRACT
The term ‘‘social media’’ generally refers to the multi-point creation and
distribution of electronic communication. It is understood in opposition to
broadcasting. This chapter explains the history of media studies as a means
of comprehending these newer media in the context of tourism. They need to
be studied in the light of existing media, even as we seek a new form of truly
interdisciplinary work that brings existing approaches together. Taking its
agenda from social movements as well as intellectual ones, and its methods
from social sciences and humanities, Media Studies 3.0 should focus on
gender, race, class, sexuality, sustainability, and pleasure across national
lines—an apt setting for those working on tourism.
Keywords: Media studies 1.0; Media studies 2.0; Media studies 3.0
INTRODUCTION
The term ‘‘social media’’ generally refers to the multi-point creation and
distribution of electronic communication. It is understood in opposition to
broadcasting (though the notion that the most popular pastime worldwide
now and in the last century should be other than ‘‘social’’ is bizarre). This
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comprehending these newer social media in the context of tourism. This
chapter discusses the social media in the light of their defunct, venerable,
and middle-aged counterparts.
Across history, media studies have been dominated by three topics:
ownership and control, content, and audiences. Approaches to ownership
and control vary between neoliberal endorsements of limited regulation by
the state to facilitate market entry by new competitors, and Marxist critiques
of the bourgeois media for controlling the sociopolitical agenda. Approaches
to content vary between hermeneutics, which unearths the meaning of
individual texts and links them to broader social formations and problems,
and content analysis, which establishes patterns across significant numbers
of similar texts, rather than close readings of individual ones. Approaches
to audiences vary between social psychological attempts to correlate
audiovisual consumption and social conduct, and critiques of imported
audiovisual material threatening national and regional autonomy. These
three components, fractured by politics, nation, discipline, theory, and
method, are embodied in what is called here Media Studies 1.0 and Media
Studies 2.0. These two formations cover a new Media Studies 3.0, and offer
some examples of how the media and tourism intersect in the contemporary
moment.
TOURISM AND MEDIA STUDIES
Media Studies 1.0
Media Studies 1.0 derived from the spread of new media technologies over
the past two centuries into the lives of urbanizing populations and the
policing questions that this posed to state and capital: What the effect on the
public of these developments would be and how they would vary between
those with a stake in the social order versus those seeking to transform it. By
the early 20th century, academic experts had decreed media audiences to be
passive consumers, thanks to the missions of literary criticism, distinguishing
the aesthetically cultivated from others, and psychology, distinguishing the
socially competent from others (Butsch, 2000, p. 3). The origins of social
psychology can be traced to anxieties about ‘‘the crowd’’ in a suddenly
urbanized and educated Western Europe that raised the prospect of a long-
feared ‘‘ochlocracy’’ of ‘‘the worthless mob’’ (Pufendorf, 2000, p. 144) able
to share popular texts. In the wake of the French Revolution, Edmund









































214 Transformations in Identity, Community and Culture
on popular passions (1994, p. 122). He was not alone, then or now. Consider
the opening line of Baroness Orczy’s famous adventure tourism novel of the
Terror, The Scarlet Pimpernel: ‘‘A surging, seething, murmuring crowd of
beings that are human only in name, for to the eye and ear they seem naught
but savage creatures, animated by vile passions and by the lust of vengeance
and of hate’’ (2009, Kindle Locations, 10488–10489). Elite theorists from
both right and left emerged across the 19th century, notably Pareto (1976),
Mosca (1939), Le Bon (1899), and Michels (1915). They argued that newly
literate publics were vulnerable to manipulation by demagogues. Even Mill
spoke of ‘‘the meanest feelings and most ignorant prejudices of the vulgarest
part of the crowd’’ (1861, p. 144). The founder of the ‘‘American Dream,’’
the Latino James Truslow Adams, regarded ‘‘[t]he mob mentality of the city
crowd’’ as ‘‘one of the menaces to modern civilization.’’ He was particularly
disparaging about ‘‘the prostitution of the moving-picture industry’’ (1941,
pp. 404, 413). These critics were frightened of socialism, democracy, and
popular reason (Wallas, 1967, p. 137). With civil society growing restive, the
emergence of radical politics was explained away in sociopsychological
terms rather than political-economic ones. The psy-function warmed itself
by campus fires, far from the crowding mass. In the United States, Harvard
took charge of theorizing, Chicago observing, and Columbia enumerating
the great unwashed (Staiger, 2005, pp. 21–22). Tests of beauty and truth
found the popular classes wanting, and helped promulgate the idea of the
newly literate and suddenly enfranchised being bamboozled by the
artistically shameless and unscrupulously fluent.
The US Payne Fund studies of the 1930s investigated the impact of films
on what a gaggle of sociologists labeled ‘‘‘superior’ adults’’ (this expression
referred to ‘‘young college professors, graduate students and their wives’’)
versus children from juvenile centers. Researchers wanted to know, ‘‘what
effect do motion pictures have upon children of different ages?’’ especially
on people defined as ‘‘retarded.’’ These pioneering scholars boldly set out to
discover whether ‘‘the onset of puberty is or is not affected by motion
pictures’’ and what they called ‘‘The Big Three’’ narrative themes: love,
crime, and sex (sound familiar?). They pondered ‘‘demonstrations of
satisfying love techniques’’ to see whether ‘‘sexual passions are aroused and
amateur prostitutiony aggravated’’ by the screen, gauging reactions
through ‘‘autobiographical case studies,’’ questionnaires asking whether
‘‘All Most Many Some Few No Chinese are cunning and underhand,’’ and
‘‘skin response,’’ as measured by psychogalvanometers attached to young










































Tourism and Media Studies 3.0 215
The Payne Fund studies birthed seven decades of obsessive social-
scientific attempts to correlate youthful consumption of popular culture with
antisocial conduct, scrutinizing audiences in terms of where they came from,
how many there were, and what they did as a consequence of participating
(Miller, 2009). In 1951, Smythe wrote of this effects research, ‘‘[e]verybody
seems to be doing it, especially those who are best qualified by virtue of
the fact that ‘they wouldn’t have a television set in the house’’’ (2004, p. 318).
Bob Dylan remembers the 1960s in Greenwich Village not only because
he was singing in coffee shops but as a time marked by ‘‘Sociologistsy
saying that TV had deadly intentions and was destroying the minds and
imaginations of the young—that their attention span was being dragged
down.’’ The other dominant site of knowledge Dylan encountered was the
‘‘psychology professor, a good performer, but originality not his long suit’’
(2004, pp. 55, 67).
Just such purveyors of normal science continue to cast a shadow across
that village, and many others. The pattern is that when cultural technologies
and genres emerge, young people are identified as both pioneers and victims,
simultaneously endowed by marketers and critics with power and vulner-
ability. They are held to be the first to know and the last to understand
the media—the grand paradox of youth, latterly on display in the digital
sublime of technological determinism, as always with the super-added
valence of a future citizenship in peril (American Academy of Pediatrics,
Council on Communications and Media, 2009). New genres and technol-
ogies are accompanied by concerns about extreme distinctions among
generations. The latest manifestation of this anxiety can be found in much
pop-intellectual work that divines the existence of ‘‘digital natives’’
(Tapscott, 2009).
Concerns about supposedly unprecedented and unholy risks deriving
from new media recur with each major technological and generic innovation.
Damnation was sure to follow cheap novels during the 1900s, silent then
sound film of the teens and 1920s, radio in the 1930s, comic books from the
1940s and 1950s, pop music and television in the 1950s and 1960s, satanic
rock and video cassette recorders of the 1970s and 1980s, and rap music,
video games, the Internet, and sexting since the 1990s.
The satirical paper The Onion (2005) cleverly mocked these interdepen-
dent phenomena of moral panic and commodification via a faux study of the
impact on US youth of seeing Janet Jackson’s breast in a 2004 Super Bowl
broadcast. Something similar in conventional tourism research can be seen
into social media, which warns corporations about how to avoid negative









































216 Transformations in Identity, Community and Culture
a particular company or resort (González, Gidumal, & López-Valcárcel,
2010; Pan, Xiang, Law, & Fesenmaier, 2011; Xiang & Gretzel, 2010). The
audience must be controlled as if it were an unruly mob of 19th-century
socialists. This anxiety and desire for surveillance has particular force when
the social media are identified as causal agents, or at least facilitators, of
child sex tourism (George & Panko, 2011).
Effects studies suffer all the disadvantages of ideal-typical psychological
reasoning. They rely on methodological individualism and fail to account
for cultural norms, let alone the arcs of history that establish patterns of text
and response inside politics, war, ideology, and discourse. Each laboratory
test, based on, as the refrain goes, ‘‘a large university in the Midwest [of the
United States],’’ is countered by a similar experiment, with conflicting
results. As politicians, grant-givers, and pundits call for more and more
research to prove that the media make you stupid, violent, and apathetic—
or the opposite—academics line up at the trough to indulge their contempt
for popular culture and their rent-seeking urge for public money. Media
Studies 1.0 rarely interrogates its own conditions of existence—namely,
governments, religious groups, business leeches, and the media themselves
account for social problems by diverting blame onto popular culture. It
takes each new medium and genre as an opportunity to affirm its omniscient
agenda (Miller, 2009).
Whereas effects research focuses on the cognition and emotion of
individual human subjects via observation and experimentation, another
way of considering audiences looks to the customs and patriotic feeling
exhibited by collective human subjects, the grout of national culture. In
place of psychology, it is concerned with politics. The media do not make
you a well- or ill-educated person, a wild or self-controlled one. Rather, they
make you a knowledgeable and loyal national subject or a naı̈f, ignorant of
local tradition and history. Cultural belonging, not psychic wholeness, is the
touchstone of this model. Instead of measuring responses electronically or
behaviorally, it interrogates the geopolitical origin of popular texts and the
themes and styles they embody, with particular attention to the putatively
nation-building genres of drama, news, sport, and current affairs. Adherents
hold that local citizens should control television, for instance, because they
can be counted on to be patriotic in the event of war. Many nations prohibit
foreigners owning TV licenses. The United States is a prominent example.
In addition to audience research and cultural policy, Media Studies 1.0
also includes political economy, which focuses on infrastructure rather
than audiences, and critical theory, which is concerned that the audiovisual









































Tourism and Media Studies 3.0 217
intersubjectivity and toward control of individual consciousness. Both
work from the nostrum that the media are all powerful. Political economy
is more policy oriented and political in its focus on institutional power.
Critical theory is more philosophical and aesthetic in its desire to develop
modernism and the avant-garde. They began as one with lamentations
for the triumph of industrialized cultural production and the loss of a self-
critical philosophical address. The two approaches are also linked via a
distaste for what they deride as mass culture. Because demand is dispersed
and supply centralized, the media supposedly operate via an administrative
logic. Far from reflecting already-established and -revealed preferences of
consumers in reaction to tastes and desires, they manipulate audiences
from the apex of production. Coercion is mistaken for free will, and culture
is one more industrial process subordinated to the dominant economic
forces within society. It seeks a maximum of standardization and a
minimum of risk. The only element that might stand against this leveling
sameness is said to be individual consciousness. But that consciousness has
itself been customized to enable efficient media production (Adorno &
Horkheimer, 1977).
Media Studies 2.0
For Media Studies 2.0, popular culture represents the apex of modernity. Far
from being supremely alienating, it embodies the expansion of civil society,
the first moment in history when political and commercial organs and
agendas became receptive to, and part of, the popular classes; when the
general population counted as part of the social, rather than being excluded
from political-economic calculations. At the same time, there was a lessening
of authority, the promulgation of individual rights and respect, and the
development of intense but large-scale human interaction (Hartley, 2003;
Shils, 1966). This perspective has offered a way in to media audiences
that differs from Media Studies 1.0 and its faith in the all-powerful agency
of the media. For inMedia Studies 2.0, the all-powerful agent is the audience.
It claims that the public is so clever and able that it makes its own
meanings, outwitting institutions of the state, academia, and capitalism that
seek to measure and control it. In the case of children and the media, for
example, anxieties from 1.0 about turning Edenic innocents into rabid
monsters, capitalist dupes, or mental Americans have been challenged by a
new culturalist perspective. This formation has animated research into the
generic features and intertexts of children’s news, drama, action-adventure,









































218 Transformations in Identity, Community and Culture
fact and fiction and talk about the media as part of social interaction
(Buckingham, 2000).
Faith in the active audience can reach cosmic proportions. It has been a
donnée of 2.0 that the media are not responsible for anything. This position
is a virtual nostrum in some research into fans, who are thought to construct
connections with celebrities and actants in ways that mimic friendship, make
sense of human interaction, and ignite cultural politics. Media Studies 2.0
commonly attacks opponents of commercial culture for misrecognizing its
capacity to subvert patriarchy, capitalism, and other forms of oppression.
The popular is held to have progressive effects, because it is decoded by
people in keeping with their social situations. The active audience is said to
be weak at the level of cultural production, but strong as an interpretative
community. All this is supposedly evident to scholars from their perusal of
audience conventions, web pages, discussion groups, quizzes, and rankings,
or by staring at screens with their children. Consumption is the key to Media
Studies 2.0—with production discounted, labor forgotten, consumers
sovereign, and governments there to protect them.
Cybertarian technophiles, struck by the digital sublime, attribute magical
properties to contemporary communications, and cultural technologies that
obliterate geography, sovereignty, and hierarchy in an alchemy of truth and
beauty. Cybertarians see omniscient, omnipotent audiences outwitting the
efforts of capital, the state, and parents to understand and corral them.
The new-media savants who construct the latter model routinely invoke
precapitalist philosophers, dodging questions of state and capital by heading
for aesthetics (Cogburn & Silcox, 2008). A deregulated, individuated media
world supposedly makes consumers into producers, frees the disabled from
confinement, encourages new subjectivities, rewards intellect and competi-
tiveness, links people across cultures, and allows billions of flowers to bloom
in a post-political cornucopia. It is a kind of Marxist/Godardian wet dream,
where people fish, fornicate, film, and finance from morning to midnight. At
such moments, one can say that what Eagleton (1982) sardonically named
The Reader’s Liberation Movement is in the house. In his survey of this
work, Mosco rightly argues that such ‘‘myths are important both for what
they reveal (including a genuine desire for community and democracy) and
for what they conceal (including the growing concentration of communica-
tion power in a handful of transnational media businesses)’’ (2004).
In tourism, the aggregated effect of collective knowledge via social media
that is associated with personal recommendations of destinations is a good
example of these claims (Popescu & Grefenstette, 2011). Such findings excite









































Tourism and Media Studies 3.0 219
social media salivate over wealthy foreigners; a typical instance is the
discourse of Chinese consumers liberated from the state (Arlt & Thraenhart,
2011). Such sanctioned greed is some distance from research that illustrates
how the social media function as surveillance-and-control devices in places
as diverse as China and Australia (Qiu, 2007) or the World Privacy Forum
proposing that people are in a ‘‘one-way mirror society,’’ where power
accretes to corporations through the supposedly even-handed tool of
interactivity (Dixon, 2010).
The fundamental dilemma for adherents of Media Studies 2.0 is this: Can
fans or tourists be said to make rational evaluations of core questions of
social justice such as labor exploitation, patriarchy, racism, climate change,
and neo-imperialism—or in some specifiable way make a difference beyond
their own selves—when they interpret TV unusually, each other about
romantic frustrations, play pirated versions of Scrabble on Facebook, or
take a cruise based on amateur recommendations?
Has the society gone too far in supplanting the panicky Woody Allen
nebbishness of 1.0 (‘‘I’m kind of bothered thaty ’’) with the Panglossian
Pollyanna nerdiness of 2.0 (‘‘Cool stuff’’)? Keen, a lapsarian prophet of the
Internet, argues that the new landscape is abuzz with noise and ignorance
rather than subtlety and knowledge (2007, p. 12). He sees a dreary world of
constant clatter and frenzied imagery denaturing aesthetics in favor of
uninterrupted stimulus. This is no 2.0 utopia! Postrel, then editor of the
libertarian Reason magazine and later a New York Times economics
journalist, wrote a Wall Street Journal op-ed welcoming 2.0 as ‘‘deeply
threatening to traditional leftist views of commercey lending support to the
corporate enemy and even training graduate students who wind up doing
market research’’ (1999).
Media Studies 3.0
One needs more frottage between Media Studies 1.0 and 2.0, breaking down
the binary between them. Media Studies 1.0 should register struggle, and 2.0
should register structure. Currently, 1.0 draws one’s attention to audience
inoculation and corporate control, but leaves out productive labor and
environmental implications. Media Studies 2.0 uptakes and responses, but
again marginalizes these key topics. Media Studies 1.0 misses moments of
crisis and hope, presenting a subject-free picture of structure but no agency,
other than psychological response, shareholder maximization, and manage-
rial rationality. Its nationalistic cultural policies often deny the banality of









































220 Transformations in Identity, Community and Culture
of who is chosen to create national images and appear in them. Media 2.0
misses forms of domination and exploitation, presenting an institution-free
picture with agency but no structure, other than fan creativity and reader
imagination. Further, both 1.0 and 2.0 are doggedly tied to nativist
epistemologies that must be transcended. The nativism is especially powerful
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and their academic satellites such
as Israel and Australia, where effortless extrapolations from very limited
experience support totalizing theories and norms, due to the hegemony of
English-language publishing and scholarly links to the warfare, welfare,
and cultural bureaucracies. The following remark (paid for by Vodafone)
encapsulates 2.0:
Mobile phones have become affective technologies. That is,
objects which mediate the expression, display, experience and
communication of feelings and emotions.yThey are an
extension of the human bodyy building and maintainingy
groups and communities. (Lasén, 2004)
This will not do. Thankfully it is challenged by a remark that could come
from 3.0—funded by a nongovernment organization of Mexican electronics
workers:
The increasingly faster and more versatile computers, appeal-
ing mobile phones, high-definition TVs, Internet, tiny music
players, ingenious photo cameras, entertaining games consoles
and even electronic pets give us the idea of a developed,
pioneering and modern world. It is indeed a new era for many;
but the dark side of this prosperous world reveals a very
different reality, that far from taking us to the future, takes us
back to a darker past. (Centro de Reflexión y Acción Laboral,
2006)
Media Studies 3.0 is as much about experiences as technologies or
institutions. The media color the world. They give it meaning; and the
process is reciprocal. The sounds, stories, and pictures that are the media—
whether social or antisocial—actually come from people. Old stories from
oral traditions become commercial narratives. Letters to the editor tell
newspapers what interests their readers. Audience measurements and focus
groups instruct producers on which TV shows are likely to succeed and why.









































Tourism and Media Studies 3.0 221
Marketers trawl street fairs, clubs, and fan sites to uncover emergent trends.
Coca-Cola hires African Americans to drive through the inner city selling
soda and playing hip-hop. AT&T pays San Francisco buskers to mention
the company in their songs. Street performance poets rhyme about Nissan
cars for cash, simultaneously hawking, entertaining, and researching.
Subway’s sandwich commercials are marketed as made by teenagers.
Cultural studies graduates become designers, and graduate students in
New York and Los Angeles read scripts for producers and pronounce on
whether they tap into audience interests.
Semiotics textbooks that critically deconstruct commercial culture adorn
advertising executives’ bookcases. Precariously employed part-timers prowl
the streets with DVD players under their arms to ask target audiences what
they think of trailers for upcoming movies, or while away their time in
theaters spying on how their fellow spectators respond to coming attractions.
Opportunities to vote in the Eurovision Song Contest or a reality program
determine both the success of contestants and the profile of active viewers
who can be monitored and wooed. In all these instances, audience creativity
is important. It informs and frightens producers, simultaneously offering
them leads on stories and trends and daunting them with its changeability
and friskiness. End-user licensing agreements ensure that players of
corporate games online and contributors to official discussion groups about
film or television sign over their cultural moves and access. Such topics
frequently elude 1.0 and 2.0. They do not fit those models.
Studying tourism through the media and vice versa must blend ethno-
graphic, political-economic, and aesthetic analyses in a global and local
way, establishing links among the key areas of cultural production around
the world (Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East) and
diasporic and dispossessed communities engaged in their own cultural
production. Media 3.0 needs to be a media-centered version of area studies,
with diasporas as important as regions. It must be animated by collective
identity and power: how human subjects are formed and experience cultural
and social space. Taking its agenda from social movements as well as
intellectual ones, and its methods from economics, politics, communications,
sociology, literature, law, science, medicine, environmental studies, anthro-
pology, history, and art, Media Studies 3.0 should focus on gender, race,
class, sexuality, sustainability, and pleasure, across national lines—an apt
setting for those working on tourism.
One can gain some tips on doing this from the history of theorizing
culture. It has usually been studied in two registers: via the social sciences









































222 Transformations in Identity, Community and Culture
differences and similarities in taste and status, as explored interpretatively or
methodically. In the humanities, cultural texts have long been judged by
criteria of quality, as practiced critically and historically. For their part, the
social sciences have focused on religions, customs, times, and spaces, as
explored ethnographically or statistically. Thus, whereas the humanities
articulate differences through symbolic norms (e.g., which classes have the
cultural capital to appreciate high culture and which do not), the social
sciences articulate differences through social norms (such as, which peoples
cultivate agriculture in keeping with spirituality and which do not)
(Benhabib, 2002; Wallerstein, 1989). This distinction feeds into the Cartesian
dualism separating thought from work. It assumes that humans have two
distinct natures: the intelligent and the corporeal. One is focused on action,
the other on reason. That binary has dominated media studies, posing
oppositions of society versus economy and audience versus meaning. It
haunts 1.0 and 2.0.
For all its sticky origins in Cartesianism, this bifurcation and silencing of
labor and culture cannot and should not hold. Historically, the best critical
political economy and the best cultural studies have worked through the
imbrication of power and signification. Blending them can heal the fissure
between fact and interpretation, the social sciences and the humanities, and
truth and beauty, under the sign of a principled approach to cultural
democracy. Grossberg recommends ‘‘politicizing theory and theorizing
politics’’ by combining abstraction and grounded analysis (1997). That
requires a focus on the contradictions of organizational structures, their
articulations with everyday living and textuality and their intrication with
the polity and economy, addressing production, consumption, and social
stratification. Half a century ago, Smythe studied TV texts as ‘‘a group of
symbols’’ that ‘‘serve as a medium of exchange between the mass media and
the audience.’’ He recognized that analyses of infrastructure and content
must be supplemented by accounting for the conditions under which culture
is made, circulated, received, interpreted, and criticized: ‘‘The produced
program isymore than the sum of the program ingredients’’ because it is
encrusted with ‘‘contextual and explicit layers of meaning’’ that emerge
during its creation and consumption (1954, p. 143).
Relevant work toward 3.0 is already underway. Rajagopal notes that
because the television, the telephone, the Internet, the neoliberal, and the
outgoing tourist are relatively new to India, ‘‘markets and media generate
new kinds of rights and new kinds of imaginationy novel ways of
exercising citizenship rights and conceiving politics’’ (2001). For Winocur









































Tourism and Media Studies 3.0 223
dictatorships has offered a simultaneously individual and social forum for
new expressions of citizenship in the context of decentered politics, emergent
identities, minority rights, and gender issues—a public space that transcends
the subordination of difference and the privileging of elite experience. Mosco
(2004) starts from the power of mythology then ‘‘builds a bridge to political
economy’’ in his investigation of neoliberal doxa about empowerment,
insisting on ‘‘the mutually constitutive relationship between political
economy and cultural studies’’ as each mounts ‘‘a critique of the other.’’
One can note similar intent animating such innovations as Sarai, the
Free Software Foundation, and the Alternative Law Forum—exemplary
instances of Media Studies 3.0 in formation. They blend internationalism,
political economy, ethnography, and textual analysis, and resist the binarism
of 1.0 and 2.0.
The art world can incarnate this approach in its critical views of tourism.
For instance, Amsterdam’s urbanscreens.org uses electronic billboards as
public space to encourage active citizenship, as do Ars Electronica of Linz
and Melbourne’s Federation Square. Artists draw attention to personal
multimedia messaging services and corporate occupancy of public space by
placing passersby on billboards, as per Zhang Ga’s Times Square People’s
Portrait, for all the world a throwback to Judy Holliday’s moment of
celebrity in the classic Hollywood film It Should Happen to You (George
Cukor, 1954), when she buys advertising space in Columbus Circle to
promote herself.
Anderson and Wolff (2010), lapsed sacerdotal zealots of the new media
from Wired magazine, say the web is dead because social networks and
software applications are supplanting the old fantasy of an open frontier
with a new hegemony of a few institutions. Schiller (2007) challenges social
media enthusiasts to query the way that economic inequalities fuel new
consumer needs, as people rush to purchase inferior services at high cost. In
the United States, for instance, the decline in governmental oversight of
the media since World War II has diminished the quality and regulation of
competition, allowing telecommunication companies to exploit the need
for connectedness in times of fragmentation.
CONCLUSION
To understand media infrastructure, it is necessary to address technological
innovation, regulation, labor, ownership, control, and environmental impact,










































224 Transformations in Identity, Community and Culture
research. To understand content, one must address production and under-
take content and textual analysis, combining statistical and hermeneutic
methods. To understand audiences, ratings, uses-and-gratifications, effects,
active-audience, ethnographic, and psychoanalytic traditions, combining
quantitative and qualitative measures should be standard.
Two examples that use 3.0 can be used to show the relationship between
the media and tourism. They concern major tourist spots thematized in
films. Each involves environmental destruction and popular responses to
corporate malevolence. They blend older and newer media in artful ways
appropriate to 3.0.
Much of Fox Studios’ Titanic (Cameron, 1997) was shot in the Mexican
village of Popotla. During the making of the picture, the national film studio
Churubusco was renovated and a National Film Commission established,
with satellites across the country providing gabacho moguls trips in
governors’ helicopters, among other services. Restoring Mexico to the
Hollywood map gained the film’s director Cameron the Order of the Aztec
Eagle from a grateful government. Titanic was, in this context, a screen
testimony to the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement/Tratado de
Libre Comercio, which has seen offshore film and television production in
Mexico increase thanks to easy shipment of technology, especially for low-
budget shoots. Studio owner Rupert Murdoch approvingly cited the number
of workers invisibly employed in making the film:
this cross-border cultural co-operation is not the result of
regulation, but market forces. It’s the freedom to move
capital, technology and talent around the world that adds
value, invigorates ailing markets, creates new ones.
Meanwhile, local Mexican film production spiraled downwards, from 747
titles in the decade prior to the agreement/tratado to 212 the following
decade (Maxwell & Miller, 2006; Miller, Govil, McMurria, Maxwell, &
Wang, 2005, pp. 164–65).
There is a cruel irony to this liquid globalization of cultural labor: the
cost of the film could have provided safe drinking water to 600,000 people
for a year. People submerged in the credits to Titanic (or not listed at all)
supposedly benefited from the textualization of a boat laden with wealthy
tourists and lumpen steerage that had been sunk by invisible ice and business
bombast 80 years earlier. During filming, Popotla was cut off from the sea
and local fisheries by a 6-feet-high and 500-feet long movie wall, built to
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sea urchins, which locals had long harvested, and reduced overall fish
levels by a third (Kushner, 1998; Miller et al., 2005, p. 165). Today, Popotla
is promoted as a destination for smiling foreigners eager to see where
their favorite drowning sequences were shot at the charmingly named
‘‘Foxploration’’ (http://www.bajatours.org/about_rosarito_beach; http://
www.rosaritoinn.com/foxtour.htm).
Such arrogant despoliation has not gone unanswered. In collaboration
with artists like Jim Bliesner, the Popotlanos decorated the wall with rubbish
to ridicule the filmmakers, and adopted the rallying cry mariscos libre (free-
dom for shellfish). (Photographs are available at rtmark.com/popotlaimages.
html.) This nifty environmental critique has largely eluded journalistic
and scholarly analysis. Ars Electronica awarded the Popotlanos a prize for
‘‘symbolic low-tech resistance to real high-tech destruction’’ that was in
keeping with the movie’s textual—if not industrial—class politics. But the
award was a fraction of the money Ars Electronica gave the film’s producers
for their innovative special effects. Resistance has come from groups
using social media to pose as officials from the World Trade Organization
to underscore the damage done to livelihoods and the environment. The
Popotlanos’ view of Cameron’s putatively green, pro-indigenous, anti-
imperialist Avatar (2009) is not on record, but their town is currently vilified
by the likes of The Washington Times as a site for ‘‘illegals’’ seeking to enter
the United States (Coombe & Herman, 2000; gatt.org/popotla.html;
Kushner, 1998; Popotla vs. Titanic, n.d.; Sekula, 2001; Spagat, 2010).
Cameron acknowledges the need to change filmmaking in light of the
ecological crisis. He is quick to point out that ‘‘Avatar was an enormous
battle film that took place in a rainforest but was 100% C[omputer-]
G[enerated]’’ (Cheney, 2010; quoted in Miller, 2010). When he castigated the
Pacific Northwest for extracting oil from tar sands, the Edmonton Sun
editorialized in best un-Canadian fashion ‘‘James Cameron is a Hypocrite’’
for working in California, where energy comes from power companies that
use coal from elsewhere (Edmonton Sun, 2010).
Three years after Titanic, Fox made The Beach (Boyle, 2000), where a
modern-day Asian Eden suddenly turns nasty for jaded tourists. Like the
earlier film, it starred the environmental moralist Leonardo DiCaprio
(Biggs, 2000). The Beach was shot in Maya Beach, part of Thailand’s Phi Phi
Islands National Park. Natural scenery was bulldozed because it did not fit
the company’s fantasy of a tropical idyll: sand dunes were relocated, flora
rearranged, and a new strip of coconut palms planted. The producers paid
off the government with a donation to the Royal Forestry Department, and
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for the country. The damaged sand dunes of the region collapsed in the next
monsoon, their natural defenses against erosion destroyed by Hollywood
bulldozers. Thai environmental and pro-democracy activists publicized this
arrogant despoliation, while the director claimed the film was ‘‘raising
environmental consciousness’’ among a local population whose appreciation
of these things lagged ‘‘behind’’ US ‘‘awareness’’ (Law, Bunnell, & Ong,
2007; Miller et al., 2005; Shoaib, 2001; Tzanelli, 2006). Director Boyle
heroically announced his intention to ‘‘give something back to Thailand’’ by
hiring Thai apprentices but then complained that ‘‘[w]e were hauling 300
fucking people around wherever we went. And you know how hard it is to
learn Thai names. Every lunchtime was like a prime minister’s reception’’
(quoted in Gilbey, 2002). Before the film was released—but no doubt after
having had their consciousness raised—the Ao Nang Tambon Administra-
tion Organization, the Krabi Provincial Administration Organization, and
various environmental groups filed a suit against Fox and local officialdom
for contravening the National Parks Act and the Environmental Protection
Act. It took seven years, but the Thai Supreme Court found in their favor in
2006 (The Nation, 2006). The reaction of the ‘‘300 fucking people’’ who were
being ‘‘hauled around’’ during production is not on record.
The political-economic background to such ecologically destructive
filmmaking implicates tourism. Structural adjustment as peddled by
neoliberal high priests at the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the sovereign states that
dominate them has encouraged the Global South to turn away from
subsistence agriculture and toward tradable services, beyond manufacturing
capacity and in the direction of human exchange. In much of Southeast
Asia, these policies pushed people into littoral regions in search of work.
Fish-farming corporations created a new aquaculture, displacing the natural
environment of mangroves and coral reefs that protect people and land. The
requirement to reconstitute themselves as entertaining heritage sites and
decadent tourism playgrounds induced Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia
to undertake massive construction projects. They built resorts at the point
where high tides lap, attracting more and more workers and decimating
more and more natural protection. Areas that had not been directed to
remove natural barriers suffered dramatically fewer casualties in the 2004
tsunami (Bidwai, 2005; Sharma, 2005; Shiva, 2005). That ugly side to
tourism and the media is something 3.0 can specify, engage, and struggle
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